As recently as a decade ago, primary equity markets in continental Europe provided investors with low levels of transparency and corporate governance standards (La Porta et al. 1997 ).
This contrasts sharply with common law jurisdictions, where investors have long enjoyed significantly higher levels of investor protection. Certainly, continental European countries have law regimes that differ from Anglo American jurisdictions, particularly in terms of disclosure. New comparative research on securities markets has shown that some legal systems give investors more protection against fraud and expropriation than others and has suggested that the control of information asymmetry is an essential precondition for the establishment of a strong capital market. As a minimum, increasing the level and scope of disclosure is likely to be significant. Higher quality disclosure, which gives the investors a higher level of protection, increases the accuracy of asset pricing, which is likely to have an impact on investor confidence (Fox 2000) .
The corporate governance regimes of most continental European countries place emphasis on rules and regulations protecting stakeholders, such as creditors and employees, in sharp contrast with the common law countries' reliance on judicially-enforced legal rules to protect investors. At a first glance, the weakness of the rules protecting minority investors from asymmetric information and opportunism makes it harder for capital markets in continental Europe to raise the external funds to support a higher rate of initial public offerings (IPOs) for high-growth, start-up businesses. Given the limits on the ability of firms to raise funds, reform-minded policymakers possess a number of alternatives that can generate rapid changes tailored to meet the regulatory needs of issuers and investors.
Previous research has shown that one way to increase investor protection in continental Europe would be for individual country regulators to generate a range of investor protections within the context of a mandatory disclosure regime and supply a more effective set of enforcement mechanisms (Bratton and McCahery 2001) . Even though it would be important to improve the disclosure requirements in company law and provide more effective enforcement mechanisms to protect investors and creditors at the national level, it is quite obvious that such a distinctive shift in the legal system is a lengthy process. Despite the efficiency benefits that greater investor protection would bring to equity markets, regulators will not, because they lack sufficient incentives, commit themselves to revise regulations that could lead to a distinctive shift in the legal system (Coffee 2001) . Further, even if EU regulators have the incentives and resources to devise harmonized legal protections that benefit investors, the revisions will not necessarily make expropriation more difficult (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Hopt 2002) .
Harmonization of corporate law in the EU, of course, is not the only way that investor protection can be improved. Given the practical difficulties of enhancing transparency and disclosure practices, corporate governance deficiencies may be addressed alternatively by establishing ex ante stock markets that guarantee better levels of shareholder protection and high levels of disclosure (Pagano 1998) . Indeed, this is precisely the route taken by Europe's 'new stock markets', i.e. the Nieuwe Markt in Amsterdam, Euro.NM Brussels, the Neuer Markt in Frankfurt, the Nuovo Mercato in Milan, and the Nouveau Marché in Paris, the latter being the first of the European New Markets (Euro.NMs). Although this is not a solution for the official markets, which are obliged to comply with the mandatory terms of the EU issuer disclosure regime (Moloney 2002) , the Euro.NMs alliance imposed additional restrictive disclosure measures on new issuers in order to promote investor protection and investor confidence.
Triggered to a large extent by the impressive emergence of high-tech businesses in the US, the Euro.NMs sought to emulate the Nasdaq, a highly liquid exchange that has high disclosure and transparency standards (Röell 1998) . Thus, as with the Nasdaq, the combination of stricter disclosure rules and less stringent entry requirements (regarding age, size, and minimum profitability requirements) than companies face on first-tier markets led to the development of a very active initial public offering market in Europe. In Germany, for example, the Neuer Markt, which created the most stringent disclosure regime, accounted for the largest share of capital raised in IPOs compared to Europe's other new markets (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002) . It is noteworthy, however, that not all new market segments have pursued a high disclosure listings strategy ). An alternative, embraced by the United Kingdom, is to eliminate exchange-based listings rules and transfer authority to the stock exchange regulator, which establishes the minimum rules governing admissions (Macey and O'Hara 2002) . For example, this regulatory arrangement gives the London Stock Exchange some discretion over which applicants, subject to their satisfying the minimum requirements, are admitted to trade on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). As can be seen in table 2, the AIM imposes less stringent disclosure requirements on the issuer.
In general, despite the higher transaction costs generated by the higher disclosure and reporting requirements of the new markets, there is ample evidence that issuing firms benefit from higher disclosure standards in the form of lower costs of capital (Romano 2001) .
Moreover, the evidence suggests that some firms floating on the Euro.NMs in the late 1990s were able to diversify their shareholdings rapidly after setting up their company . Diversification is particularly important since the models developed by Kahn and Winton (1996) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) predict that firms with highgrowth rates and volatile cash flows will go public early in their life cycle and thus allow the founders to diversify their investments.
This chapter focuses on the initial offerings in the European New Markets which are largely under-researched markets. We study the short-run and long-run performance of Euro.NM IPOs. Ex ante it is difficult to formulate a hypothesis about whether or not initial underpricing in the Euro.NMs is higher or lower than underpricing in the regular markets. On the one hand, stronger disclosure requirements on the Euro.NMs reduce the degree of asymmetric information between insider and outsider shareholders such that credible offer prices are more likely to be set and underpricing tends to be lower than on the regular markets. On the other hand, the entry requirements are less stringent for the Euro.NMs than for the regular markets where some of the smaller firms and those with short trading histories would not be admitted.
This implies that more uncertainty about the correct offer price (maybe resulting in more severe underpricing) is to be expected for the Euro.NMs. Which of the two effects applies is an empirical matter which we investigate in this chapter. We document that the average underpricing measured on the first day ranges from as low as 4 per cent in France to a staggering 86 per cent in the Netherlands. We argue that the large differences in underpricing across the Euro.NMs can be explained in terms of differences in industry distributions. Our results confirm the findings that sectors with a high degree of information asymmetry will be significantly underpriced (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm 2001) . We also examine the long-run performance of IPOs on the Euro.NMs over the period of 1996-2000. Whether or not the long-term price correction for the Euro.NMs is stronger or weaker than that for the regular markets may depend on the degree of initial price reaction (underpricing). We also investigate the effect of the bursting of the 'internet bubble' in 2000. Although, there are numerous studies on the long-run performance of IPOs on Europe's main equity markets, this is the first study that explores the long-run performance of the Euro.NM IPOs.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the history and performance of the Euro.NMs. Section 3 analyses the listing and disclosure standards of these markets. In our discussion, we emphasize that the few discernable differences between the set of listing and disclosure requirements among the new markets are unlikely to serve as the basis for an institutional explanation for the higher underpricing during the bull market of 1996-2000. In section 4, we provide data on the short-run underpricing and consider alternative theories for the high short-run underpricing on the Euro.NMs. We also document the long-run underperformance of the Euro.NM IPOs and discuss a number of explanations for this phenomenon. Section 5 concludes.
Rise and fall of the European New Markets
Sub-section 2.1 focuses on the competition between stock exchanges that has led to the increasing irrelevance of national boundaries. Increased competition has led to the creation of new market segments which have new listing and disclosure rules that facilitate the capital raising process for high-growth, start-up companies. In sub-section 2.2, we describe the creation of the European New Markets in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. We discuss the common regulatory features of the alliance of European New Markets, showing that the adoption of lower entry requirements and more stringent disclosure rules played an important step in the development of these exchanges. We argue that there are a number of reasons why the listing and disclosure rules played little or no role for the high underpricing of IPOs on the Euro.NMs.
Competition between exchanges
In the past, exchanges were natural monopolies and there was little competition for listings (Mahoney 1997) . Within this framework, the relationship between stock exchanges and firms applying for a listing was viewed as giving rise to a long-term contract in which stock exchanges supplied liquidity, corporate governance rules, clearing and monitoring services and a signalling function to investors in exchange for listing fees (Macey and O'Hara 1999) .
However, the globalisation of securities markets has recently led to a growing number of companies seeking to raise capital across borders and financial markets becoming more integrated. At the most general level, the forces shaping the competition between exchanges are a direct result of technological innovation, elimination of cross-border capital controls, and the introduction of new trading systems. An immediate consequence of the changes that have taken place is the diminished role of exchanges as the dominant supplier of high quality corporate governance rules, and monitoring, signalling and clearance services. It is important to underline the obvious fact that because there are alternatives to products and services supplied by exchanges, it is reasonable to assume that exchanges will face increasing competition from automated trading systems, where it is possible to trade securities generally listed on exchanges (Steil 1996; DiNoia 1998) .
While in the US there has been strong competition between equity markets for a long time, competition among exchanges in much of continental Europe goes back to the mid-to-late 1980s only (Macey 2001) . Some have noted that the competition between European exchanges has led to significant reductions in trading fees -which have benefited investorsand a proliferation of trading mechanisms which increase market liquidity (Pagano 1998 ). In the context of competitive capital markets, exchanges present issuers with a choice of listing requirements, trading systems, and trading and listing fees (Santos and Scheinkman 2000) .
These are offered by profit-maximizing exchanges in order to maintain their competitive advantage (Biasis and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; Foucault and Parlour 1999) .
Unfortunately, there are significant differences in the level and quality of competition between the main and secondary markets in Europe. For the most part, the effective absence of competition within countries between first and second-tier exchanges was a primary cause (along with inadequate investor demand) of the undercapitalised state of European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Röell 1998 ). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the focus of Europe's first-tier exchanges on large, blue-chip firms reduced the attractiveness of the second-tier exchanges, which made it difficult for these exchanges to attract listings from firms that would be eligible to list on a first-tier exchange. Naturally, the most obvious way for the second-tier markets to compete with the rival first-tier exchanges was to become an independent exchange, like Nasdaq, which could provide a home for high-tech firms in Europe that would normally apply for a US listing. To a large extent, the emergence of the Euro.NMs, along with Nasdaq Europe (Easdaq) and AIM is best seen as an attempt to pursue such a strategy.
Euro.NMs
In 1996/97, the European New Markets were launched in order to facilitate the financing of innovative companies with a high-growth potential, which were the type of companies that continental European listing rules would have excluded earlier. The Euro.NMs were developed to provide European equity issuers with an alternative to the -at the time -shining example of Nasdaq. Consequently, the Euro.NMs established admissions, listings and disclosure regulation, trading procedures and operational standards as a means to achieve an efficient decentralized market which reduced the barriers to flotation for small and mediumsized companies and provided start-up ventures with the best possible access to risk capital (Avgerinos 2000) . The Euro.NMs also adopted a dual trading system consisting of a mix of a quote-driven and order-driven system, to ensure adequate market liquidity. By creating greater liquidity for the shares of SMEs and setting high listing and disclosure standards, the New Markets also aimed at attracting institutional investors.
The French New Market (Nouveau Marché) was the first to be created and commenced operating on 14 February 1996 as an alternative, independent investment market governed by its own organizational and operating rules while trading and clearing is done by SBF-Paris . The need for compulsory lock-ins is particularly important for firms subject to higher asymmetric information such as the young and high-tech firms of the Euro.NMs.
The decision to discontinue the Neuer Markt is part of a wide shake-up of the way German companies are listed. Companies will have to comply with a set of vigorous reporting standards. Technology stocks will be brought to the main exchange, where companies will be listed on different segments according to their size. A segment for small to mid-cap companies will sit underneath the blue chip constituents of the DAX.
Probably, further consolidation is inevitable given the failure of the New Markets to attract foreign companies. 5 There can be little doubt that consolidation will most likely be a natural consequence of the introduction of the European Commission's new disclosure regime, which is designed to transform the Listing Particulars Directive and Public Offers Directive. The new regime is based on the introduction of enhanced, uniform disclosure standards for public offers of securities, the introduction of a shelf-registration document, and the adoption of a multilateral admissions system. Ultimately, even though the new proposed disclosure regime is designed to benefit companies that raise capital on Europe's national exchanges, the evidence suggests that the proposed removal of the distinction between the official and second-tier markets and the requirement for the approval of prospectuses will have a costly impact on small and medium-sized firms and the performance of the new markets (Moloney 2002 ).
5 Nasdaq Europe suffers even more from low liquidity. Innogenetics (listed on Nasdaq Europe) claimed that its share price suffered from the low liquidity of Nasdaq Europe and applied for a listing on EuroNext Brussels. The announcement of the listing triggered a positive announcement reaction of 19.2% which can be attributed to the higher liquidity provided by that market. An earlier transfer (for liquidity reasons) by Melexis from Nasdaq Europe to EuroNext had a similar price reaction.
Listing and Disclosure Requirements
In this section, we briefly discuss the economics of listing rules and then describe the main features of the listing and disclosure requirements for the European New Markets. As noted earlier, one of the main reasons for the success of the Euro.NMs in developing a more active IPO market is the enhanced listing and disclosure requirements imposed on issuer firms (see table 2 ). Although, in this section, we find some differences in regulation between the markets, we argue that these differences are minor and cannot be the main reason for the substantial differences in the short-run and long-run performance of IPOs.
From the outset, it is important to note that exchanges provide an important service consisting of a screening of the information provided by the firm applying for a listing. The quality of this information is important, as analysts and investors will use it to evaluate the performance and prospects of the firm. In establishing listing requirements, stock exchanges aim to safeguard the interests of investors by requiring the disclosure of sufficient information about the applicant for a listing. Typically, exchanges will establish minimum quantitative standards -minimum number of shares outstanding, average trading volume, market value of outstanding shares, and public shares outstanding -financial criteria, and disclosure requirements. It is generally acknowledged, however, that stock exchanges do not, for many reasons, provide a financial assessment of the filings of the applicant firms. Even though stock exchanges will only evaluate applicant firms on a going concern basis, the issuer's choice of exchange, nevertheless, will signal important information to investors about the firm. In this analysis, it is assumed that the branding of listing rules will have a direct effect on the level of competition between exchanges for listings (Macey and O'Hara 2002) . The proliferation of exchanges will offer firms applying for a listing a greater variety of choice of listing rules (Santos and Scheinkman 2000; Foucault and Parlour 2001) . The most direct effect of the competition of exchanges in the design of listing rules is that high-disclosure exchanges will attract more firms than low-disclosure exchanges (Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeir 1999) . This argument rests on the assumption that liquidity traders will choose to trade in firms listed on high-disclosure exchanges. In turn, corporate insiders, who control the listing decision, will follow the flow of liquidity to the exchanges where the trading costs are lowest. In a closely related paper, Boot and Thakor (2001) show that, since high-quality firms will benefit from a better disclosure of certain types of information, exchanges will have to revise their disclosure regimes upwards, to be able to attract sufficient numbers of high-quality listing firms. There is another argument in favour of improved disclosure standards:
the benefit of higher standards for issuing firms is that the listing reduces the firms' cost of capital (Fox 2001) .
Despite the ongoing competition between the Euro.NMs and the other second-tier exchanges (e.g. Nasdaq Europe and, AIM and the techMark), there has recently been substantial convergence in terms of new listing regulations. The rules, among other things, require the filing of quarterly reports, the provision of continually updated information, and the submission of financial statements that must be reported in US GAAP, IAS or a national version of GAAP. Detailed economic research of firms listed on the Neuer Markt has revealed that the differences in the bid-ask spread and share turnover across IAS and US GAAP are statistically insignificant (Leuz 2002 ). The implication is that US GAAP and IAS are equivalent in terms of quality. Interestingly, nearly every new market in Europe allows listed firms to adopt either IAS or GAAP. From the perspective of an issuer, the Euro.NMs' admission and listing obligations are rigorous and quite extensive. For example, the rules are also reasonably stringent with respect to lock-in periods, the issuing prospectus, and disclosure of transactions by managers. Yet, in other respects, the admissions rules are not very stringent: the issuer size requirements, minimum proceeds and trading history rule allow young, small firms (like e.g. innovative high-growth companies) to seek a listing.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the listing and disclosure criteria for the two largest exchanges in the Euro.NMs alliance, the Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché. We noted earlier that the Euro.NMs have substantially converged in terms of their disclosure and transparency requirements and operational standards so as to make their markets attractive to investors. In particular, the enhanced level of transparency that the Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché demand of issuing firms can be seen as an advantage, particularly if listing firms expect to attract the support of institutional investors. Table 2 states the criteria that issuers must satisfy in order to list on the Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché. In terms of prerequisites for admission, the rules on the two markets are very similar. First, the issuer must have at least ¼ P RI HTXLW\ FDSLWDO 6HFRQG WKH minimum number of shares issued must be at least 100,000 and the minimum market capitalization must be at least ¼ P 7KLUG WKHUH PXVW EH a minimum free float of 20 per cent.
Firms are required to have a market maker to provide liquidity support. Fourth, at least half of the shares offered in the IPO must be primary shares, i.e. shares that increase the firm's equity. In contrast to the Neuer Markt which has a six-month lock-in period for all shares, the Nouveau Marché subjects insiders to a lock-in of 80 per cent of their shares for a period of 12 months or 100 per cent of their shares for 6 months. The listing prospectus of firms applying to either market has to contain information about: (1) the issuer, its share capital, and business; (2) the assets, financial position, and profits and loss statements; (3) associated companies and affiliates of the issuer; (4) (Goergen and Renneboog 2003) . Across all the New Markets, those floated on the Brussels market are the oldest with an average age of 13 years. The average size varies substantially across markets: the market capitalization of the average (median) French firm is 4.6 (2.5) times smaller than the average (median) German IPO.
Book-building was used as the pricing method for all the IPOs, except for about 78 per cent of the Dutch IPOs which used the fixed price method. The book-building ratio in table 3 is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book-building low to the difference between the book-building high and the book-building low. The book-building ratio ranges from 0 to 1 if the price was set within the book-building range. A ratio of 0 means that the offer price was set to the lower bound of the book-building range and a ratio of 1 means that it was set equal to the upper bound. In a few cases, the initial book-building range was different from the final book-building range, and as a result the offer price was outside the initial range. For these cases, the ratio will either be negative (if the final range was lower) or higher than 1 (if the final range was higher). 7 The median ratio for each market was exactly 1, except for the Italian market which had a median ratio equal to its mean of 0. Rogiers et al. (1993) reported underpricing by about 10 per cent for a sample of 28 IPOs on the Brussels stock exchange. Cherubini and Ratti (1992) Why is underpricing of German and Dutch Euro.NM high-tech firms 4 to 5 times larger than that of firms on their main markets and why are there large differences across the Euro.NMs?
We need to ask whether differences in listing and disclosure rules between the main markets and between the Euro.NMs can account for the differences in the initial performance. As hypothesized in section 1, stronger disclosure rules on the Euro.NMs than on the main markets and the resulting reduction in asymmetric information are expected to lead to less underpricing on the Euro.NMs. We have documented that this is not the case. Thus it seems that the listing requirements, which are more lenient for the new markets than for the main markets, can be responsible for a more cautious setting of the offer price resulting in higher underpricing on the Euro.NMs. Still, listing rules cannot explain the differences in short-run underpricing across the Euro.NMs. First, since the listing rules for both markets are virtually identical, they cannot account, to any significant extent, for the wide divergence in performance between the Euro.NMs. Second, we are skeptical that other legal/institutional explanations, such as differences in rules concerning litigation risk and the probability of litigation in the countries concerned, shed light on the pattern of underpricing on the Nouveau Marché or Neuer Markt. Unlike the United States, the legal liability of underwriters is not economically significant in continental Europe .
Apart from listing rules -largely equivalent to IPO characteristics like age, size, trading and profit history -differences in industry distribution also explain differences in initial underpricing between Euro.NMs and the main markets, on the one hand, and between the Euro.NMs, on the other hand. We calculate long-run returns for periods of between 1 and 5 years using data from Datastream. To avoid the impact of the initial underpricing and that of price support by the underwriter, the first 4 weeks of trading were excluded. We opted for weekly returns rather than the traditionally used monthly returns as some of the Euro.NM IPOs have less than 3 years of share prices. We use two different methodologies and two different benchmarks as a robustness check on our results. First, we use the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are defined as follows for the case of the 3-year period: [insert table 7 about here]
Conclusions
In 1996/97, the European New Markets were launched in order to facilitate the financing of innovative companies with a high-growth potential. These were the type of companies that continental European listing rules would have excluded earlier. Consequently, the Euro.NMs established admissions, listings and disclosure regulation, trading procedures and operational standards as a means to achieve an efficient decentralized market which reduced the barriers to flotation for small and medium-sized companies and provided start-up ventures with the best possible access to risk capital. We find that Euro.NM IPOs are substantially younger than IPOs on the main markets. Except for the Belgian market, Euro.NM IPOs also come from different industries, mainly high-tech industries.
The initial returns we documented in this chapter are remarkable in four ways. First, underpricing is on average 2-3 times higher than that on the main markets. It should be noted that the Euro.NMs were created during a surging IPO-wave and about two years before the bursting of the dot.com bubble. Second, the distribution of the initial returns is very different from that of IPOs on the established markets. Especially, the proportion of IPOs with negative initial returns is much higher. Third, in the period starting one month after the IPO and ending 10 For each of the Amsterdam, Brussels and Milan markets, one outlier firm was removed. Prolion (NMAX) gave a return of around 800 per cent in its first year of trading (603 per cent in the first two years and 545 per cent in the first three years of listing). The impact of one firm was such that without removing it from the sample the first year-average returns were 33.53 per cent, but its removal brought the returns down to -29.33 per cent (significant). International Brachytherapy (Brussels Euro.NM) had a return of 461 per cent in its first year. Open Gate (Nuovo Mercato) achieved a return of 173 per cent in the first year of listing. three to five years after the flotation, the buy-and-hold returns and the cumulative abnormal returns of firms introduced on the European New Markets are strongly negative and even substantially more negative than long-term returns on the main markets. Fourth, even across Euro.NMs, we find large differences in short-and long-run performance. Underpricing ranges from only 4 per cent on the Nouveau Marché to 86 per cent in the Netherlands. The differences in underpricing also induce differences in the long-term price corrections.
It is puzzling that underpricing and long-term performance between the Euro.NMs are so different. What we can largely rule out are differences in regulation: those differences are only minor and cannot account for the major discrepancies in performance across markets.
Furthermore, the flotation method cannot explain differences either as most firms introduced on the Euro.NMs (with exception of NMAX) used the book-building method. We have shown that the performance discrepancies can largely be explained by differences in firm and industry characteristics. Small deviations in industry distribution (especially in terms of the weight of internet and telecoms firms) can already account for significant performance differences between the Euro.NMs. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) show for a sample of US IPOs that more fragmented ownership, lower pre-IPO insider ownership stakes, lower equity stakes held by venture capitalists and investment banks, and directed share programmes can already explain some changes in performance across time. Furthermore, the agency conflicts between issuers and investment banks may also account for the differences in IPO performance over time and across markets. Loughran and Ritter (2001) and Biais et al. (2000) conjecture that issuers grew complacent as valuations spiralled.
Finally, the larger underpricing and stronger market correction in the Euro.NMs compared to the main markets suggests that a higher degree of uncertainty (resulting from more lenient listing rules in the Euro.NMs) and investor irrationality were present in the new markets. (140) 100.0% (321) 96.3% (27) 22.2% (9) 96.8% 
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Appendix:
Industrial analysis of long-run performance of Euro.NMs ' IPOs (1996 ' IPOs ( -2000 This table shows the long-run performance over one to five years for all companies floated on the Euro.NMs by industry. CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return adjusted for one of two indices: the FTSE Eurotop 300 or the FTSE Euromid indices. The Eurotop 300 is a widely accepted European benchmark, which measures the performance of Europe's largest 300 companies in terms of market capitalization. The Euromid represents the medium capitalization companies across Europe and consists of all the companies in FTSE World Europe index minus the FTSE Eurotop 300 companies. BHR stands for buy and hold returns. Both the CAR and BHR are calculated for several years starting one month subsequent to the flotation. In parentheses, Brown and Warner t-statistics are given for the cumulative abnormal returns and the skewness-adjusted t-statistics are given for the BHR. ***,**,* stand for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
